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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article addresses one of the most fundamental issues facing legal researchers 
today; how deeply should computers and artificial intelligence be relied upon in 
advancing legal science and in the formulation of legal policies?
The millennia long challenge to develop what we now call law is an innately 
human project, one with creative, cultural, and unavoidable questions of our 
Grundnormen and moral values. As such, the development of law should remain a 
primarily human-led and nurtured project, to attain legal systems that match our 
cultural identities and enable us to continue our journey to evolve as humans into a 
better future. 
This article explores these issues from the research perspective of comparative 
contract law, as it is well documented for over two thousand years and can thus give 
illumination to the broader concepts of legal evolution, of law matching the cultures 
to which it belongs, and to an ever-changing aspect of law, for purposes including 
greater equity and efficiency for broader gains in social welfare. 
Perhaps due to the nature of capitalism and its search for cost efficiency, 
perhaps due to the quantitative aspects of contract law, perhaps due to the focus 
interests of Silicon Valley, contract law has seen much attention from the AI 
researchers and thus this outcome enables early points of discussion that do not yet 
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exist in other others of substantive law. 
2. ANCIENT CONTRACTS RE-EXAMINED AS STRUCTURED TEMPLATES
2.1. QUERY ON NATURAL LAW?
While perhaps it cannot be evidenced that all societies have, do, and always will 
share identical notions of contract law, a clear outcome of a century of comparative 
contract law research reveals that deal-making and bargain-making is surprisingly 
similar across cultures and across different historical eras. In examining the records of 
contracts across several thousand years and multiple cultures across the globe, the 
notions of equity, or of justice in private contract, is so persistent, it sometimes 
appears as if there were a Natural Law of Contracts.
2.2. CONTRACTS FROM OLD BABYLON (2000 BC TO 1600 BC)
There are and have been differences in the details of contract law, but we can actually 
legally understand ancient Mesopotamian contracts without much additional 
guidance, once the ancient language is translated into a modern language. Similarly, 
modern scholars read textbooks on Roman law to understand how to think about our 
own contract laws of today.（１） Ancient Mesopotamia and the Roman Empire were 
surely very different cultures from our own, yet, their contracts are similar to our 
own. When it comes to talking about contracts, we seem as humans ready to 
understand bargains and fairness in trade.
Archaeologists have discovered that textbooks to learn contract law are 
nothing new, for those books existed in ancient Mesopotamia over 3,800 years ago.（２） 
The ancient contract law books were primarily collections of models of abstracted 
contracts to which personal and commercial details could be added to convert the 
（１） 　For an example textbook used across the United Kingdon, see DU PLESSIS 2015.
（２） 　King & Hall 1906. 
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templates into actual contracts. Many of these legal primers have been found and 
recovered by archaeologists;（３） the forms of their contracts are readily recognizable to 
modern lawyers from both Civil and Common Law traditions. 
First take a look at an Old Babylonian contract for a boat rental:（４）
・  One [boat of 50 gur capacity], [one] rudder, [three] punting poles, four oars, 
[two] ropes for towing the boat:
・  (this is) the boat of Nanna-meša (which) Ur-Šulpa'e has rented from Nanna-meša 
for two months.
・  Ur-Šulpa'e will measure to Nanna-meša 6 gur of barley as its monthly rent
・  The boat must be returned in good condition, together with its rent, at [the quay] 
of Nippur.
Next take a look at another Old Babylon contract for a loan of silver:（５）
・  One third of a min[a of silver],
・  an interest rate of 12 shekels per mina is to be added
・  Ur-Ninsun received from Lugal-melam;
・  (to be given back) [in the se]cond [month]
Once translated from Old Babylonian to a modern language, the elements of a 
contract are immediately obvious. A set of duties and obligations from one side 
matched with duties and obligations from the counter side. One finds objects of 
contract, quantity, pricing, the naming of parties, time and/or place of performance, 
（３） 　For an online archive, including those discussed herein, see the University of Pennsylvania’s 
“Old Babylonian Model Contracts” collection; available at  http://oracc.museum.upenn.edu/
obmc/corpus 
（４） 　Contract 3N-T0567, id.
（５） 　Contract CBS 06822, id.
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even terms of returnable condition and interest rates. These are valid contracts in 
most legal systems today. 
But what is also interesting, is the basic Babylonian mode of teaching and the 
basic method of drafting contracts. The Babylonians taught and used structured 
contracts − there was a lack of legal theory but a very strong presence of format and 
of structured information. Most Babylonian contract drafters were simply clerks, 
filling in a form, without substantial legal knowledge. And what is really interesting, 
is that this approach is very much how contract law software works today, based on 
structured templates. The ancient Babylonian lawyers were basically taught an 
algorithm for writing contracts and they did not need to understand contract law 
theory to be functional. And nor do computers today need to understand law, so long 
as they can receive the necessary data to complete the forms. 
3. CONTRACT LAW AND FORMAL LANGUAGE
Since the earliest days of law, and this is found in letters sent by Hammurabi to his 
judges,（６） law has been an encounter between humans, a mode of documenting and 
communicating on our methods of coordinating rights and privileges. We speak of 
civil codes, of court cases, of Domat, Blackstone, and von Savigny. We are speaking 
of human thoughts and human words. 
Indeed, most of the earliest samples of writing found by archaeologist is 
commercial in nature, documenting contracts, taxes, and notions of property. In 
ancient Mesopotamia, some of the earliest documented modes of writing appear to be 
clay envelopes, called bulla, that contained miniature models of inventory inside with 
personal identification details written outside; often these bullae appear to have 
（６） 　Johns 1904, 318. Chapter II is full of letters, in translation, from Hammurabi to his judges. 
Id., 316-326. See also King 1898, LVII − LXIII, listing four dozen such letters. 
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facilitated trade, it is thought that they could have serve as proto-written contracts. 
In Hammurabi’s Code, in article 5, he required all judges to document their 
findings and decisions in writing.（７） At article 100, he requires that commercial loans 
be documented in writing. Articles 104 and 105 discuss requirements for keeping 
receipts of trades. Article 122 requires written contracts for transactions involving 
precious metals. For Hammurabi, almost 4,000 years ago, written private law and 
written public law were already standard procedures. 
Even in early China, some of the earliest Kanji were 買 and賣 , clearly 
reflecting the need to document commercial transactions. So, deal making and 
contractual Grundnormen go back millennia, if not even further back into prehistory, 
everywhere around the globe. 
Thus, from the earliest of times, the law was in our language, in our speech, 
and in our human forms of communication. 
Let us consider the Greeks of Athens.（８） The ancient Greek word for law, 
nomos, originally referred to songs or chorus, as the Greeks taught and conveyed their 
laws in songs. Even the Babylonians likely committed their contract models to 
memory by chanting. 
Greek courts were held outside, in front of thousands of local citizens, usually 
on the edge of the local city market (‘市場 ’). Greeks would hire orators to aid them 
in litigation, knowing that the dikastes /dikastai (‘jury/judges’) was composed of 
thousands of local men, who would engage in counter-chanting. And like football 
fans today, the Greeks would cheer and jeer during trials, singing songs of law. 
But time marches on. These days, we seldom sing or chant law. We write and 
（７） 　See generally: Lyon 1904, Jenkins 1905, and Pfeiffer 1920. For the specific citations to 
Hammurabi’s Code, see King 1898. For notes on the economic content of Hammurabi’s Code, 
including specific notes on contract law, see Nagarajan 2011, 112-113. 
（８） 　See Blackwell 2003. 
113 － COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: METHODOLOGICALLY HUMAN OR ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT?（Roy Andrew Partain）
− 212 −
document law and legal acts, and we do so, we act to formalize our language to speak 
more precisely of contracts based on our theories of contract law. And although our 
contractual language has approached formalism, through civil codes and international 
conventions, it remains in a language readily recognized. 
Unlike the physical scientists and computer programmers, we lack an actual 
formal language for law; perhaps Leibniz is to blame. 
4. LEIBNIZ AND TWO PATHS TO LEGAL SCIENCE
4.1. A MISSED CHANCE AT FORMAL CONTRACT LAW
A genius at mathematics and physics, Leibniz thought of himself as a lawyer and 
philosopher. He was seeking to develop the new Wissenschaft, (‘science,’ the German 
phrase means ‘knowledge making’), become more robust with more rigorous 
foundations. Germans still speak of our legal arts as Rechtwissenschaft, of ‘making 
legal knowledge’, or as more commonly translated, as ‘legal science.’ 
Wissenschaft quickly became the word for post-Renaissance efforts in science. 
And, there too, Leibniz created the mathematical method of calculus, as so widely 
used across the physical sciences. 
It can be argued that Leibniz did not recognize the cognitive divide that we do 
today, that physical science is performed with mathematical structures while law 
remains safely away from calculus and advanced mathematics, safely discussed in 
‘human language.’ 
If Leibniz had chosen to equally develop a new formal language or formal 
methodology for discussing law, as he had done for physics, perhaps we today would 
have an equally rigorous method of discussing legal rules and juristic acts. But we 
know he hoped to create such a formal language, a characteristica universalis, a 
system of symbols wherein ideas could be combined algebraically via method called 
the ‘calculus ratiocinator.’ In 1685, in The Art of Discovery, Leibniz set down an 
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extraordinary idea: 
The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as 
those of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a 
glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply 
say: Let us calculate [“calculemus”], without further ado, to see 
who is right.（９）
And,
This is why, with the gradual progress of the human species, it can 
come about, perhaps after many centuries, that no one will any more 
be praised for accuracy of judgment; for the analytic art (which is 
still virtually confined to mathematics in its correct and general use) 
will have become universal and applied to every type of matter 
through the introduction of a scientific notation (‘philosophical 
character’) such as I am working on. Once this has been accepted, 
correct reasoning, given time for thought, will be no more 
praiseworthy than calculating large numbers without an error. ”（10） 
(underscoring added.)
Leibniz imagined that we could calculate legal arguments as objectively as physicist 
calculate the motion of spheres. Yet, we will never know what Leibniz’s results would 
have been, as his formal law project went uncompleted at his death. 
If he had succeeded, comparative contract law might be more mechanical in 
nature, more automatic in its detection and inspection of differences in contract law 
rules across legal cultures. What would it be like to write law in a structural language, 
（９） 　Navarro M.G. (2013) On Fuzziness and Ordinary Reasoning. In: Seising R., Trillas E., 
Moraga C., Termini S. (eds) On Fuzziness. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 299. 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
（10） 　Marciszewski 2001, 41; with reference to Ross 2004. 
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perhaps it could be like HTML, as we use to design webpages, or could it be like 
LISP, used to program artificial intelligence programs?
4.2. COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW − A SUCCESS STORY OF INTELLECTUAL 
SPIRIT
What Leibniz did achieve, however, was to reinvigorate the idea of comparative law. 
In his Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Iurisprudentiae (‘New 
Methods of Studying and Teaching Jurisprudence’), he advocated seeing law as 
clustered into family groups. This established the very foundation of modern 
comparative law. 
In 1900, Edouard Lambert and Raymond Saleilles expanded on Leibniz’s 
objective vision of comparative law to a new normative project, to find ways to 
improve civil law via the comparative examination of private law, and potentially, to 
establish a new universal ius commune. 
Saleilles had been inspired by the writings of another scholar, Gustave 
Boissonade; the same scholar involved in the Meiji era legal reforms in Japan. 
Boissonade had several goals for his vision for the goals of the comparative law 
research project: (i) continual progressive improvement of law, (ii) to induce a 
convergence of legal rules, (iii) and a particular focus on these effects for commercial 
law and contract law. 
Saleilles wrote of a “a concept of natural law superior to all domestic laws and 
would be the aim of all laws.”（11） Thus, this comparative law project of continual, 
progressive convergence of law was intended to achieve a re-discovery of a higher 
Natural Law, and especially a ‘Natural Law’ for commercial and contract law. 
4.3. OUR NEW ‘NATURAL LAW’ FROM BOISSONADE AND SALEILLES
And in many ways, these early goals of comparative contract law have been achieved. 
（11） 　Jamin 2002, 175 (Underscoring added.)
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A few decades ago, a student would have needed to learn the whole of the 
contract systems of certain major legal cultures, such as the private law systems of 
France, Germany, and England. And some comparative law text books remain that 
way, but most modern text books now focus on a short list of key issues that often 
arise in intra-Member State multi-national contract law negotiations:
・  What are ‘offers’ versus ‘invitation to offers’?
・  Post-formation updates to the basic bargain
・  How many material terms need to be agreed to in order to achieve a contract?
・  Priority of standard language versus negotiated terms
・  Objective versus Subjective interpretation of contractual terms
・  The revocability of already tendered offers
・  When is the onset of good faith duties, pre-bargain, at bargain, post-bargain?
・  How completely does acceptance need to ‘mirror’ the offer to obtain a bargain?
・  Do you need ‘consideration’, do you need a causa?
・  Does contract law contain protections in equity or are you committed to your 
risks?
・  How broadly can a judge use ‘reasonableness’ to restructure a contract?
・  Does good faith apply in un-negotiated areas, does reasonableness?
・  Does ‘responsibility’ for breach behavior affect liability?
・  How does force majeure affect breach and liability for breach?
Of course, there are many other potential other areas of differences can be found in 
comparative contract law, but for most students and most practitioners, this list is 
probably sufficient. 
And this great convergence, this result of approaching legal harmony for 
contract law, is in many ways a direct result of comparative contract law and the role 
its scholars played in developing the great modern legal conventions to coordinate 
international or interstate contracts（12）. 
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We now can see where private law appears to have converged in many aspects, 
as comparative scholars have analyzed various rules, examined efficacy and 
efficiency of those rules, and made various recommendations of legal reforms. As a 
result, a better understanding of legal evolution and of distinct clusters of legal 
origins have been gained.
In more recent years, comparative law has also revealed how the market place 
of ideas is a contagious forum, that legal rules or habits can find application in new 
jurisdictions; thus, legal rules can become transplanted in new legal cultures. 
Convergence in legal rules for contract law and commercial law has been everywhere 
found.
But this was by far not the historical trend nor data, for before the comparative 
legal scholars began, there was great divide and distance between scores of nations 
and legal cultures around the world. 
The results of the comparative law project, both theoretical and diplomatic, are 
not to be found in historical data and were not the result of machines and drone 
worker, but in the intellectual spirit, originality, and creativity of the humans engaged 
in the project. 
5. COASE AND THE COMPLEXITY OF CONTRACT LAW
What this has done, is to leave comparative law a very different course at the 
（12） 　Examples such conventions from ‘Hard Law’: (i) United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG); (ii) Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as adopted 
by all 50 states and many territories in the US; and indirectly via historical adoption by US 
common law courts, (iii) the ALI’s Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts. Examples of 
converging norms in contract law from ‘Soft Law’: (i) UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts; (ii) the European Union’s Principles of European Contract Law (PECL); 
(iii) the European Union’s Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR); and (iv) the Principles 
on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (2015) (the “Hague Principles”).
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university level, compared to what a student might have found fifty years ago. Instead 
of wondering what different contract law systems might have in common, we now 
wonder why differences remain at all. 
And what has become very clear is that all of these questions emerge from a 
singular problem, an incompletely specified contract. As Mackaay wrote, 
“a complete contract is one in which hypothetically parties assumed 
to be perfectly informed and acting rationally have provided a 
solution for any contingency that may arise during the performance 
of the contract. In such a contract, all mishaps have been 
internalized.”（13） 
But contracts cannot be fully specified. And it appears that Coase’s Theory of 
Transaction Costs may be at the core, much as it is for the other half of Obligations, 
in Tort Law.（14）
Furubotn and Richter’s theory of Rational Incompleteness of Contracts states 
that due to transaction costs, no contract can be both efficient and complete.（15） Even 
earlier, Herbert Simon had developed a theory of satisfycing, that there are rational 
limits in even trying to be rational, as that bears costs too.（16）
And of course, life is very complex and if you spent the time required to type 
all the many potential possibilities, then the object of the intended contract may very 
well expire before you could finish typing that contract. This problem is known in 
（13） 　Mackaay 2013, 427-429.
（14） 　Id.
（15） 　Furubotn & Richter 2005. See ch 5.6, “The Incomplete Contract Model,” id. 
（16） 　Simon 1956, 129. “Both from these scanty data and from an examination of the postulates of 
the economic models it appears probable that, however adaptive the behavior of organisms in 
learning and choice situations, this adaptiveness falls far short of the ideal of ‘maximizing’ 
postulated in economic theory. Evidently, organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do 
not, in general, ‘optimize.’” Id.
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computational science as algorithmic complexity theory, and most contracts will be 
too complex to fully determine within the limits of future human history.
Thus, contracts will always be under-detailed and under-specified. Even under 
Saleilles’ call for a ‘Natural Law’ of contracts, the contracts themselves will be 
incomplete. 
Given that problem, what might be done to aid business negotiators to draft 
better contracts? Might there be a technological solution?
6. COMPARATIVE LAW AND COMPUTING SCIENCE
A few years ago, my home university decided to sponsor industrial research, offering 
grants to multi-disciplinary research teams to solve new problems in supporting our 
North Seas-based economy. It was an exciting opportunity and many professors came 
together to find new solutions. 
6.1. WORKING WITH COMPUTING SCIENTISTS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING
Luckily for me, I was already engaged with the Department of Computing Science, as 
we were drafting what became the UK’s first LLB in Law with Computing Science 
− a program that fully trains students as both computer programmers and as lawyers, 
fully qualified for career paths on both sides. We had already explored many areas of 
how the future of law would be deeply interactive with the knowledge and skill sets 
of computer programmers. 
We knew of artificial intelligence (‘AI’) programs that could read case law, 
e.g. court case decisions, and extract out the court’s holdings or new legal rules 
without human assistance.（17） We knew of programs that could apply legal logic to sets 
of evidence to determine if rights had been violated and if so, whose rights. We knew 
some corporations were already making use of AI-based online arbitration platforms, 
（17） 　See Shulayeva, Siddharthan, & Wyner 2019.
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where the AI program enabled quicker arbitration results. We were lucky to have a 
leading computational linguist,（18） so we also learned of programs that could read 
stories extract the main story elements. We also saw how AI programs and Deep 
Learning programs could take a large, rambling story and condense it, accurately into 
an abstract. 
So, we were very aware of the pre-existing capacity in computer programming 
to facilitate legal work, legal logic, and legal decision making. This is a very wide 
range of tools, potentially reducing many efforts at modern day law firms. 
In exploring potential applications to facilitate client/lawyer interactions, I 
shared an observation that clients often wanted to negotiate their own contracts, that 
lawyers might not be invited to contractual discussions until negotiations became 
complex or until maybe conflicts arose. Such habits could give rise to poor legal 
consequences, as the clients might lack expertise in multinational comparative 
contract law, even if well versed in their own domestic contracts laws. We decided to 
explore the creation of an application that would monitor emails and chats and then 
automatically draft the contract in the background of those communications; then 
both client and attorney could then collaborate on edits and re-drafting. 
The key problem was that we would need to be able to structurally explain 
contract law to the computer program so that it could work with the logical elements 
of the contractual frameworks. 
6.2. CONTRACT LAW AS A RATIONAL AXIOMATIC ART
But that might not be as complex as it first seems, as the very foundations of modern 
contract law started alongside axiomatic geometry. 
Jean Domat, a French professor of Roman Law,  had designed his Lois Civiles 
（18） 　Dr Adam Wyner. Currently serving as Associate Professor of Law and Computer Science at 
Swansea University. 
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dans leur Ordre Naturel (“Civil Codes in their Natural Order”) based on the very 
logical and axiomatic forms of his good friend, Blaise Pascal, whose own works De 
l'Esprit géométrique (“On the Spirit of Geometry”) and De l'Art de persuader (“On 
the Art of Persuading”) had enlightened the Renaissance world to the benefits of 
modern axiomatic geometry.  So it was, the beginning of modern contract law was 
drafted by a close companion of Pascal.
And that power of math, of logically driven axioms, is why Domat, then 
Pothier, and then every other civil code thereafter utilizes the axiomatic method in 
building civil codes from fundamental legal concepts to expansive codes. 
Due to these early efforts of Domat and Pascal, France’s intellectual 
foundations for contract law were axiomatic and logical. And because they lived in 
the 1600s, and due to the further work on contract law by Pothier in the 1700s, 
England accepted much of this intellectual framework into its own evolving contract 
law by case-based reference to these scholars; thus, much of the Contract Law found 
in the Common Law arises from the same scholarship as the French Law of 
Obligations. Thus, Common Law and Civil Law both benefit from this shared 
inheritance of rational axiomatic model of contract law. Thus, it’s easier to program 
contract law than you might first expect. 
6.3. DESIGNING A MACHINE TO COMPUTE CONTRACTS
To solve the client/attorney problem described above,（19） the program could create a 
draft contract that followed a more formal mode of contracting to make it easier to 
review by both machine and by humans. That text could then be shared by email or 
by simultaneous cloud-type sharing. Via that mode of sharing, the application could 
also connect the lawyer so the lawyer could monitor the drafting in real-time 
evolution, being able to add legal counsel when needed but remain discreet when the 
（19） 　See, supra, sec. 6.1.
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business talks were going well. This, from the computing science side, could all be 
done in some form of XML, a human and machine readable ‘mark-up’ language, 
much like the internet’s HTML. 
And, the legal component, the part of the program that held the legal logic of 
contracts, could be modular, so that you could implement a choice of law option; the 
negotiator could select if they wanted London’s Contract Law, Singapore’s Contract 
Law, or wherever’s contract law, and the program would simply look at a different 
contract law module and everything else would work the same. 
And this was all simple and good, if, and only if, the two parties were inside 
the same legal culture. But interesting international business contracts are not mono-
cultural, no, they are multi-legal-cultural. And that is really true within the EU open 
market, wherein dozens of Member States have open and flowing economies but 
retain their own domestic contract law systems. 
So, for all the neat stuff just explained, the project was likely to be a failure 
unless we could somehow automate multinational comparative contract law 
somehow. 
6.4. CONTRACT LAW AND GRAPH THEORY
And herein is the really interesting part of the story. Turns out that a mathematical 
model already exists to handle such a problem. And that kind of mathematics is called 
Graph Theory.（20）
Graph Theory looks at both data points (aka nodes or vertices), the distance 
between those data points (aka as edges), and potential geometries of how they all 
connect. So, if you could take a simple legal concept, reduce it to several key 
dimensions, and then evaluate how each different legal culture graphed its legal rule, 
then you could algorithmically compare various graphs for the same legal concept. 
（20） 　For a leading text book on Graph Theory, see Steen 2010.
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You could detect the distance and shape of two legal cultures on a single rule and thus 
determine if they operated the same way, or, if differently, how much differently. 
How might one do this? 
First, a scholar would decide how many contract concepts exist for his project, 
it might be dozens or scores of fundamental legal concepts such as ‘can a contract be 
oral’ or ‘can a minor be bound by contract’. So, a long list of legal concepts would be 
drafted. Fortunately, comparative contract law has already done much work in 
identifying and examining this area.
Second, the scholar would need to add the legal answer, which we would call 
the legal graph. This is where expertise in comparative contract law is needed, to 
know the answers of how a legal system addresses the many issues of contract law. 
But we would need to speak of law in a new way, as that answer needs to be 
machine readable, so we’d likely need to ask the legal questions in binary, yes/no 
style, (‘can a contractual object be criminal in nature’) or in clearly created sets of 
options (‘acceptance to an offer to contract can be delivered (i) written, (ii) oral, (iii) 
performance, or (iv) other pre-determined manners’). And this step could be 
completed one of two ways: by human surveying or by deep learning algorithms. 
Third, we would need to complete these first two steps for multiple legal 
cultures. Any legal cultures we would want to include in the software, we would need 
to create these legal graphs. As a result, we would have a collection of legal graphs 
for each legal culture.
Fourth, we could analyze all of the legal graphs, to see how much ‘distance’ 
existed between each legal concept from each legal culture’s graph. This would result 
in what is called a network model, reflecting the multi-dimensional analysis of each 
graph in an integrated model. 
Given all that work, we could then take a singular draft contract and then 
computationally analyze it to see how it would be interpreted by different legal 
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systems, and very importantly for real life negotiations, reveal where multiple legal 
cultures read the contract in the same way and where the different legal systems do 
not agree on the meaning of the contract, so that negotiations could work to enhance 
the drafting to avoid those problems after contractual formation. 
6.5. BACK TO THE METHODOLOGY CHOICE FOR COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW
Graph Theory could give us a method to explore the similarity and differences within 
comparative contract law systems, but a very fundamental problem remained at the 
very core of our project. How to create the basic graphs, by human scholastic survey 
and feedback, or, by using deep learning algorithms?
And key to that question, what do we gain or lose by that choice of method? Is 
it a matter of speed or convenience, is it a matter of grappling with bias and cherry 
picking, is it a matter of human meaning versus mathematical coefficients? 
In studying this potential computer program for comparative law work, we 
may have discovered something very important, that humans and deep learning 
systems operate differently, that we create different results, and that the choice of 
methodologies needs to be better understood by lawyers as we grapple with law in the 
future. 
7. THE NEW DANGER OF DEEP-LEARNING IN CONTRACT LAW 
− AND ITS CURE
The danger we faced in examining the legal rules to create legal graphs for each 
system of contract law was how to actually get that work done, by human or by 
machine?
7.1. DANGERS OF MECHANICAL COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW
The first option was for a human to sit down, write out a list of legal issues, 
determine how to phrase the issues in a machine friendly format, and then to 
determine the answer for each issue in the new format. This is both tedious and 
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exposes the data set to the personal legal biases of the legal researcher. The bias 
problem could be reduced by using teams of researchers and averaging their answers, 
but that is even more laborious and time-consuming. But, to retain human input 
would reflect an understanding of comparative contract law from a human 
perspective, informed by our culture, legal theories, and legal histories. 
The alternative was to allow deep-learning systems to identify issues and their 
graph-based answers. The technology now exists that deep learning systems can 
process large libraries of text files to identify patterns, even clusters of patterns. Deep 
learning machines and artificial intelligence programs can also be written to extract 
rules from narrative texts, like court cases. So, the ‘legal research’ task could be 
automated, letting the machines determine how many legal issues are important 
enough to examine, and, how each legal culture ‘graphs’ their legal rule. And of 
course, as the work would be done by machines, their work product would be 
machine readable. 
But several problems would quickly emerge. 
First, we may not recognize the ‘legal rules’ that the machines identify as 
‘legal rules.’ The machine does not feel our culture and our morals, no, it merely 
spots trends and patterns in legal data. The rules identified by the machines may have 
no cultural meaning for humans, no connection to our core legal theories or notions of 
justice. The computer identified rules will simply be meaningless correlations, data 
edges with no necessarily humanistic meanings. But the machine will identify 
patterns and process them as patterns. 
Second, the choice of data to feed the computer is messy at best. Does one 
feed the machines all of a country’s legal corpus? Does one limit the data to certain 
years, to certain types of legal materials, does one include non-legal but clearly 
guiding materials, such as religious testaments or philosophical works? A ‘cost 
effective’ answer might be to use large, pre-made specialty databases, e.g., a database 
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on CISG materials or collections of arbitration cases. And could one ensure that each 
legal culture benefitted from identical data sets, to ensure a proper match of data. 
Low cost to use data sets that would appear to focus on the necessary commercial or 
contract laws. But cost effective might be the wrong measure; is equity and justice to 
be founded on cost savings?
Third, a deeper question: does our law mechanically emerge purely from our 
history of law, is law purely a pre-determinative process, that if you know all the past 
law to a point that you could forecast all the future of law? Or, does law continue to 
experience new genius, new goals of justice, new areas of conflicts, new political 
problems or dreams? If the answer is the first, that human law is a mechanically 
produced set of legal rules, fully predictable like a baseball can be predicted by 
physics, then deep learning and artificial intelligence machines will do an efficient 
job of determining our comparative contract laws and also the future of our laws. 
But if that is not true, then the answer is that law evolves in connection to the 
genius of the human spirit. And if law emerges from our hearts and souls, if law can 
suddenly take on new unexpected goals, then allowing the machines to compute and 
determine our rules would in fact lock us into a prison of law based on historical 
modes of law. We would be presented with an interesting interpretation of the history 
of law, from a machine’s identification of rules and rule clusters, but that result might 
be unintelligible to us, as if written by space aliens. 
We will have lost both control of our law and the cultural meaning of our laws. 
7.2. MORE BROADLY ON COMPUTING BABYLONIAN CONTRACTS
This article has discussed a particular legal software project that exposed our 
researchers to the broader issues facing contract law and comparative contract law in 
the future. But the problem is fundamentally present in all digital contract law, not 
just this one experience. 
Smart contracts, as written in computer languages, do enable an interesting 
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form of formalized contract language.（21） So long as the performance space remains 
within the cyber-world, contracts can be fully self-monitoring and completing of 
contractual objectives. 
But computers, and computer users, can readily include input from the outside 
world into cyber-world, so real world performances, such as finished painting the 
house or washing the car, can be inputted and validated so that the digital contract 
continues its own performance of the contract. And indeed, we see examples of this in 
modern taxi services, such the US’s Uber, China’s Didi, and Korea’s Tada wherein 
most of the contracting is automatic and online, with elements of real-world 
confirmations of service built-in. 
But where these digital contracts fail, and fail us as a society, is how they lack 
awareness of their own contractual performance. The machine cannot render ‘good 
faith’ to you no more than it can genuinely understand equitable reliance or notions of 
liability. In all of the digital contracts reviewed in my research, none have ever 
addressed contract law beyond that Mesopotamian style of clerically written contract 
templates. For that is honestly what smart contracts are for now. Digital versions of 
Babylonian contracts. 
These digital contracts are not Justinian’s Roman contracts, nor are they 
Aristotle’s Attic Greek contracts, they merely enable ancient modes of contracting by 
form and template. And as many of today’s lawyers cannot read, dissect, or program 
these new digital contracts, there is little guarantee that either the contract nor the fora 
of its performance recognize any of our transnationally held Grundnormen for 
contract law. When a digital contract mis-performs, how do you tell it pacta servanda 
（21） 　For example, when people speak of BitCoin, they often include discussions on smart 
contracts and decentralized autonomous organizations, both particular forms of algorithmic 
contracts that can be programmed in computing languages. Smart contracts can be written in 
general purpose languages, e.g., Python, or in specialized languages such as Ethereum.
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sunt?
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
If we, as comparative contract scholars, do not learn to find a way to speak law in a 
more formal mode, Law and her Justice will no longer be ours. No longer in our 
voice as humans. For the wheels of commerce will seek to mechanize legal services 
and legal advice much as industry has already mechanized so many aspects of 
commerce. And as explored above, the computing machines will not find law as we 
find it. 
The key is to enable lawyers to be able to remain in control of this process. For 
it is very clear that corporations and universities will continue to encourage and 
finance the development of mechanically computed law and legal projects. Thus, 
legal researchers and legal professionals must learn to code, to math, and to see law in 
new ways − to fund a way to express law formally so that we can lead the conversation 
on how to compute law. 
If the legal community lets the machines do the work, then we will lose our 
own control of law, our own sense of legal meanings and theories, and as a 
consequence, we will lose our ability to seek and claim justice. It sounds dramatic 
today, but if we cannot engage as programmers, as modelers, then those who can so 
program the machines will be left to engineer ‘law’ for us. 
OR, we can find new ways to write and speak of law. We can complete 
Leibniz’s vision for law to have its own formal language, so that humans can design 
legal problems for machines to compute, but securely on our terms, in our legal 
cultures, with our notions of fairness and justice central to the calculations. 
And most importantly, by achieving this capacity, we will best protect our 
ability to be creative legal scholars and ardent advocates for the future generations of 
humanity. 
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